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A FAILURE OF BOTH WORKERS' COMPENSATION
AND TORT: BUNKER V. NATIONAL GYPSUM CO.
JORDAN H. LEIBMAN*
TERRY M. DWORKIN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Since early in the twentieth century, employees suffering sud-
den traumatic injury arising out of and in the course of their employ-
ment have been able to turn to their states' workers' compensation
systems for relief.' Although only one state compensation statute
originally covered health impairments caused by occupational diseases,
most were later amended to include them.' In recent years these oc-
cupational disease compensation systems have been deluged with
claims of disability, impairment, and premature death allegedly caused
by a number of toxic substances that are found in the workplace;3
* Associate Professor of Business Law-Indiana University.
** Associate Professor of Business Law-Indiana University.
1. The workers' compensation approach to the industrial accident problem
originated in Europe. "[Tihe principle of accident compensation without respect to respon-
sibility" was adopted in Germany in 1883 and England in 1897. N. CHAMBERLAIN &
D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 498 (1971) (emphasis in the original). Between 1895 and
1910 most American states enacted employer's liability laws which, in differing detail,
modified the common law in favor of employees. S. COHEN, LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
441 (4th ed. 1979). In Indiana, for example, contributory negligence was made an affir-
mative defense to be pleaded and proved by the employer. Id. at 457 n.8. The first
American no-fault workers' compensation law was probably Maryland's, enacted in 1902,
which only provided for $1000 payments to dependents of workers killed in a very
few very hazardous employments. R. HELFGOTT, LABOR ECONOMICS 401 (1974). New York
passed its workers' compensation law in 1909, and by 1948 similar legilsation had been
enacted in all the states and Puerto Rico. G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP. ECONOMICS OF
LABOR RELATIONS 601 (9th ed. 1981).
2. The only state which covered occupational diseases in its original legisla-
tion was Massachusetts. Gradually political opposition to this coverage was overcome,
and now all states provide compensation for at least some occupational diseases. As
of 1979, thirty states provided full coverage, while twenty states provided scheduled
coverage for specific diseases. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 443.
3. 68 A.B.A.J. 1075 (1982). In addition to asbestos, which has generated the
most claims (see infra note 4), some of the other workplace substances which are having
a growing impact due to their delayed manifestation injuries are formaldehyde, PVC,
radiation, and microwaves. New workplace carcinogens are being identified almost
monthly-newspaper ink (see e.g., Hanna v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. C-81-1697 (N.D. Ohio
1981); Grady v. Sun Chemical Corp., No. C-81-1696 (N.D. Ohio 1981)), asphalt fumes (Wall
St. J., Apr. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 5), and flourescent lights (Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1983,
at 26, col. 3.). It was recently discovered that wood-model makers in the auto industry
are 50% more likely to develop cancer, although the specific carcinogen has not been
Liebman and Dworkin: A Failure of Both Workers' Compensation and Tort: Bunker v. Natio
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
942 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
the industrial substance producing the greatest number of such claims
in recent years has probably been asbestos.4
Of late, asbestos claims have generated considerable publicity
and have created widespread concern for the viability of a number
of manufacturing companies5 and their compensation insurance
identified. Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 6. The impact of many of these hazardous
substances on the compensation systems could be as great or greater than asbestos.
Suits arising from exposure to microwaves, which has occurred almost exclusively in
the workplace, have been predicted to be the broadest-based product liability litiga-
tion ever. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1981, at 24, col. 1. Formaldehyde, which has been de-
scribed as ubiquitous (Nat'l L.J., May 10, 1983, at 30, col. 2), is used in a wide variety
of ways in the workplace. Use has been especially heavy in the forest-products in-
dustry, which uses one-half of the formaldehyde produced, and the textile industry,
which uses one-fourth. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6. In all, about 1.4 million
people come into contact with formaldehyde solutions in the workplace. Wall St. J.,
May 21, 1982, at 1, col. 6. The U.A.W., which along with 14 other unions, sued OSHA
to set stricter exposure standards in factories, claims that as many as one percent
of workers exposed at current levels may die of formaldehyde-related cancers. Wall
St. J., Mar. 15, 1983, at 1, col. 5. The AFL-CIO cited formaldehyde as a health hazard
to workers in beauty salons and barber shops where it is used as a sterilizer and
in some beauty products. In addition, the union is critical of OSHA's delay in requir-
ing the publication of a list of suspected carcinogens in the workplace. Wall St. J.,
Jan. 4, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
4. One study of almost 20,000 workers of the International Association of
Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers spanning a twelve-year period, showed
that 36% of the workers who died of asbestos-related cancer applied for workers' com-
pensation awards. The death rates among these workers was 37% higher than what
would normally have occurred among blue-collar workers of similar ages and lifestyles.
The study estimated that 18.8 million workers had had "significant" exposure to asbestos
since 1940, of which 14.1 million were still living. Seven million living workers had
less exposure, but were at some risk. In addition, the families of workers were at
risk due to contact with the asbestos workers and their clothing. It was estimated
that 200,000 of the workers at high risk will die from asbestos-related cancers by the
end of the century. Many more will be disabled. Lauter, Who Pays Asbestos Victims?,
Nat'l L.J., July 27, 1982, at 14, col. 2, citing a study of Dr. Irving Selikoff of the En-
vironmetal Sciences Laboratory of the Mount Sinai School of Medicine.
5. The filing for reorganization of the Manville Corporation has received the
most publicity. While not in current financial difficulty, Manville claimed that protec-
tion under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was necessary because a study showed
its potential liability from asbestos-related suits could reach $2 billion, and its net
worth was only $1.1 billion. Some claim the Manville filing was motivated by the desire
'to put pressure on the federal government to shoulder some of the liability arising
from exposure to asbestos during World War II shipbuilding activity. Wall St. J., Aug.
27, 1982, at 1, col. 6. At least two other firms, U.N.R. Industries, Inc. and Amatex
Corp., have filed for bankruptcy due to asbestos-related claims. Wall St. J., Feb. 9,
1983, at 27, col. 2. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. moved its employees and manufactur-
ing operations to another company in lieu of declaring bankruptcy. Forty-Eight was
left to handle the more than 13,000 asbestos-related lawsuits against it. 68 A.B.A.J.
1559 (1982). Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. changed its name to Raymark Corp. and
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carriers.' For the most part this public interest has focused on pro-
duct liability actions brought against manufacturers of asbestos pro-
ducts, rather than on workers' compensation claims brought against
employers. Inasmuch as the workers' compensation concept was
originally adopted because the tort system proved an ill-suited and
inefficient mechanism for resolving injury and health claims arising
in the workplace, one may well question why taere has been this
massive return by workers to dependence for re!ief on tort litigation.
State worker compensation is generally held to be the sole
remedy available to workers who seek relief from their employers.'
This principle is adhered to for the most part by reviewing courts,8
although there has been some recent erosion of the concept in a
number of jurisdictions.' In California, for example, the courts adopted
the dual capacity doctrine, which permits product liability actions by
injured workers against employers who are also manufacturers of the
defective injury-causing workplace products.' The California
Legislature, however, recently moved to halt this development by
statute."
reorganized in an effort to improve its image and shield itself from some asbestos-
related liabilities. Wall St. J., June 18, 1982, at 16, col. 3. In addition, the auditors
of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. qualified the company's 1982 financial statement because
of concern over asbestos-related litigation.
6. Legal Times, March 30, 1981, at 1, col. 3. It has been estimated that the
insurance industry may be liable for $38.2 to $90 billion over the next 35 years due
to asbestos-related diseases. Wall St. J., June 18, 1982, at 26, col. 3. A few experts
have stated that some insurers may collapse due to the number of asbestos suits.
Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
7. IND. CODE S 22-3-2-6 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 31-293 (West 1972).
8. See e.g., Billy V. Consolid. Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 412 N.E.2d
934, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1980); Longever v. Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 80 Mass.,
Adv. Sh. 1767, 408 N.E.2d 857 (1980); Cohn v. Spinks Indus. Inc., 602 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.
Ct. Civ. App. 1980). For additional case authorities, see Utken, Workmans Compensa-
tion, 1978 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 11 IND. L. REV. 340, 342 n.7(1978). 9. See, e.g., Moreno v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 110 Cal. App. 3d 179, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 747 (1980); Knous v. Ridge Machine Co., 64 Ohio App. 2d 251, 413 N.E.2d 1218
(1979); cf. Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 505 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (predic-
ting that Pennsylvania state courts would follow a dual capacity doctrine).
10. See Bell v. Industrial Vangas Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 30 (1981). In the Industrial Vangas case the California Supreme Court expressly
adopted the dual capacity doctrine for employers who were also product manufacturers.
The basic doctrine was first recognized in California in Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d
781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952), in a context in which a nurse was permitted a direct suit against
her employer-chiropractor who had negligently treated her after a work related acci-
dent. Subsequently, the doctrine was applied by a number of intermediate appellate
courts. See e.g., Moreno v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 110 Cal. App. 3d 179, 167 Cal. Rptr.
247 (1980); Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
11. See CAL. LAB. CODE S 3602 (West 1982). "ITihe fact that either the employee
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The sole remedy principle of workers' compensation does not,
of course, preclude third party actions against workplace product
manufacturers who are not the employers of the injured workers. 2
Such claims are being pursued with increasing frequency and vigor,
especially in jurisdictions where the potential recovery under the tort
system is far greater than that available under workers' compensa-
tion. Indiana is such a jurisdiction. The Indiana Workman's Compen-
sation Act and the Occupational Diseases Act only provide for $83,000
as the maximum non-medical recovery available to injured workers
or to thier survivors, if they are killed on the job." For incapacitating
illness or injury, or for death, this amount does not begin to compen-
sate for years of lost wages. Compensation for pain and suffering is
unavailable under any state's workers' compensation system 4 although
such special damages would be recoverable in a successful tort claim.
Thus where the non-medical components of impairment and disability
awards under workers' compensation are relatively low, the incen-
tive to find a deep-pocket third party tort-feasor is increased, despite
the additional problems the claimant must face in proving negligence 5
or the essential elements of strict liability in tort. 6
or the employer also occupied another or dual capacity prior to, or at the time of
the ... injury shall not permit the employee ... to bring an action at law for damages
against the employer." Id.
12. See e.g., IND. CODE S 22-3-2-13 (1982).
13. IND. CODE S 22-3-3-22 (1983).
14. Schwartz, Historical Overview of Workplace Compensation & Evolution of
Possible Solutions, FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS. WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORKPLACE
LIABILITY 43 (1981).
15. Under negligence the plaintiff must prove the defendant breached a duty
of reasonable care owed the plaintiff and the breach proximately caused legally
cognizable damage. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 281 (1966).
16. In the case of a third party defendant, who is a product manufacturer,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965) or an equivalent would apply. Section 402A
provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to lia-
bility for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
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This article will not focus, however, on the widening gap in poten-
tial recovery between tort claims and those under workers' compen-
sation. Instead, it will examine the case of Bunker v. National
Gypsum," in which all claims against the plaintiff's employer were
entirely frustrated because the Indiana workers' compensation system,
as well as its tort system, proved unresponsive to the delayed
manifestation characteristics of the occupational disease caused by the
claimant's exposure to asbestos.
The injurious delayed effects of asbestos exposure are becoming
increasingly well known.'" If victims are unable to obtain relief from
either the tort or workers' compensation systems-the two legal
mechanisms designed to distribute the costs of work related accidents
and health impairment through the enterprises which have generated
the risks-they will be forced to fall back on more diffuse compensa-
tion systems such as state and community welfare, medicaid, social
security disability, and the like. Unlike the tort system and workers'
compensation, these relief systems have no built-in incentives to reduce
aggregate health and accident costs, and are therefore less desirable
risk distribution mechanisms.' 9
In this article plaintiff Richard Bunker's effort to recover in tort
will be considered first," and then the history of his workers' com-
pensation claim will be analyzed.2' These cases raise a number of fun-
damental procedural, interpretative, constitutional, and public policy
tion and sale of his product, and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relations with the seller.
17. 406 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (common law negligence); 426 N.E.2d
422 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) rev'd. 441 N.E.2d 8 (Ind. 1982) (review of decision of the In-
diana Industrial Board).
18. See supra note 4. Lawscope, 68 A.B.A.J. 397 (1982); Lauter, Who Pays
Asbestos Victims?, Nat'l L.J., July 26, 1982, at 3, col. 1; Masters, Asbestos Liability
Suits Strain Manufacturers, Court Systems, Legal Times, Mar. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
19. We assume that a social risk distribution mechanism has at least three
objectives. The first is to allocate the risk and its costs to various entities in propor-
tion to the share deemed appropriate for each as mandated under societal consensus.
The second is to distribute catastrophic losses among all strata of society rather than
permitting such loss to be borne entirely by unfortunate individual victims. The third
is to distribute the initial catastrophic costs to parties that have the power to effect
remedial change so as to motivate those parties to reduce over time the aggregate
cost of accidents and health impairments. Compensation systems which ignore this
third objective provide no incentives for accident reduction, and we therefore argue
that they are deficient and should be triggered only as a last resort.
20. See infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 45-99 and accompanying text.
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issues. Bunker's appeal of his workers' compensation claim to the
United States Supreme Court was dismissed,22 and while the Indiana
General Assembly seriously considered legislation to soften the statute
of limitations constraints which led to the denial of Bunker's claims,23
the bills as yet have failed to receive the support necessary for
enactment.
When a worker suffers injury or health impairment as a direct
result of his employment, and is unable to recover under either
worker's compensation or tort, these systems can be said to have failed
in their essential purpose. This article will consider whether the failure
in Bunker was justified, and if not, which institution- court or
legislature- should take responsibility for taking corrective action.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
24
Bunker was employed by National Gypsum Company in February
1949. He was exposed to asbestos fibers for about two years in his
position as supervisor of a blending process for the manufacture of
an acoustical product. He remained in National Gypsum's employ un-
til 1966, but was not in close contact with asbestos after his initial
exposure in 1949-50. In 1976 Bunker underwent exploratory surgery
during which it was diagnosed that he was suffering from asbestosis.
He brought a claim for workers' compensation under Indiana's Oc-
cupational Disease Act (hereinafter referred to as Act) in June 1978.
He also filed a companion civil action against National Gypsum alleg-
ing that his employer was negligent in permitting him to be exposed
to a toxic substance. Both of these claims raise interesting questions
of law.
III. BUNKER'S TORT ACTION
To avoid confusion it should be noted at the outset that Bunker's
tort claim against National Gypsum' was not a product liability action
brought under some sort of dual capacity theory.2" Although National
22. Bunker v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 441 N.E.2d 8 (Ind. 1982), appeal docketed,
51 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1983) (No. 82-11243).
23. Indianapolis Star, March __, 1983, at 7B, col. - (article discusses three
bills before the Indiana General Assembly which would extend the statute of limita-
tions on asbestos claims to as long as twenty five years.)
24. The essential facts in Bunker are not in dispute. This summary is taken
from 441 N.E.2d 9-10 (Ind. 1982).
25. See Bunker, 406 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
26. Needham v. Fred's Frozen Foods, Inc., 179 Ind. App. 671, 359 N.E.2d 544
(1977).
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Gypsum was the manufacturer of the acoustical product containing
the asbestos which Bunker alleged to be the cause of his asbestosis,
Indiana has firmly rejected the dual capacity doctrine as well as other
attempts by employees to maintain common-law actions against their
employers under theories that the employer is more than one legal
entity (e.g., landowner),"7 or has committed an intentional tort against
the employee.28 The exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy
against employers is firmly established in Indiana.
Bunker's claim did not attack the exclusivity principle of workers'
compensation, rather it was based on the theory that his cause of
action antedated the enactment in Indiana of the sole remedy provi-
sion of the Occupational Disease Act. Prior to 1963 the Act provided
"that it was applicable only to those who had affirmatively accepted
it. There was no evidence presented that National Gypsum had
accepted the act."' In 1963 the Act was amended to cover everyone
unless "the employee has exempted himself from the act."3
Bunker noted that his exposure had occurred prior to 1963, and.
so his claim should be governed by the language of the Act that
existed prior to the 1963 amendment.31 Because, presumably, he had
contracted the disease during the period 1949-1963 and had not
discovered his illness until 1976, Bunker argued that his tort claim
had occurred prior to the enactment of the amendment and should
therefore be actionable.
The Indiana Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the Act as
amended in 1963 would control Bunker's case because claims against
employers for occupational disease became exclusive under the Act
in 1963, and the date of accrual for such claims was the date of
disablement-not the date the disease was contracted.32 Bunker was
first disabled for a short period in 1976 while his disease was being
diagnosed, and thus the Act became his exclusive remedy (assuming
that he otherwise qualified under the Act).
27. Witherspoon v. Salm, 251 Ind. 575, 243 N.E.2d 876 (1969); Jarbon v. Gib-
son 409 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
28. See Cunningham v. Aluminum Co. of America, 417 N.E.2d 1186 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981). The court discussed several Indiana cases in which attempts to circum-
vent the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act, by alleging intentional tortious con-
duct on the part of employers, were rejected. Id. at 1190-91.
29. 406 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
30. Id. at 1240-41.
31. Id. at 1240.
32. Id. at 1241.
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The effect of the ruling was to extinguish in 1963 any un-
discovered Indiana tort claims against employers which had accrued
prior to that date. When Bunker brought his civil action against
National Gypsum, there was some question whether a tort claim in
Indiana accrues at the time that an injury occurs, or only when in-
jury and "damages ... "susceptible to ascertainment' ,,33 concur. If the
latter point in time were the rule, Bunker would have no tort claim
in any event, because his cause of action would presumably have ac-
crued only when his disease had developed to the point where damages
were ascertainable, and presumably that would have been after 1963
when the Act would certainly have controlled the case. It is fairly
clear now, however, that a tort action in Indiana accrues at the mo-
ment of injury, which in the case of asbestosis may mean at the time
of exposure to the hazard or when disease-discoverable or not-
begins to develop. 4 Therefore, Bunker's tort claim was probably ac-
tionable prior to 1963, but he lost the right to brifig it as the result
of his failure to initiate the tort suit prior to the 1963 amendment
of the Occupational Disease Act.
Even if there were no amendment to the Act, Bunker would still
have had a problem with the Indiana two year general tort statute
33. Withers v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 878, 880 (S.D. Ind. 1970) (em-
phasis in original) (quoting Gahimer v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 241 F.2d 836,
840 (7th Cir. 1957)); see also Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 679, 161 N.E. 251,
259 (Ind. 1928); Seates v. State, 383 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
34. In Shideler v. Dwyer, 417 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 1981), the Indiana Supreme
Court ruled that a cause of action in tort accrues when the defendant's act later proves
to have been actionable, even if that moment could not have been ascertained at the
time of injury. Shideler was a legal malpractice case in which the court relied on an
occupational disease case, Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287,
200 N.E. 824 (1936), for the proposition that a pneumoconiosis victim's cause of action
accrues at the moment the employee inhales the dust which later results in his disability.
Recently, the rule in Schmidt was upheld in the context of an asbestos case
in Steinhardt v. John's Manville Corp., 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d
1297 (1981). The dissent in Steinhardt noted that mere inhalation of asbestos dust may
never give rise to a cause of action if disease ultimately fails to develop. Therefore,
the date of accrual should be moved up to at least that moment when disease, i.e.,
injury, begins to develop, and determining that moment is a jury question. Id. at 246
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the New York Legislature
had adopted that reasoning in its Agent Orange legislation. Id. at 246 n.2. It is not
entirely clear which accrual date Indiana has adopted-the time of invasion of the
plaintiffs body, or the metaphysical moment when ultimate manifestation of disease
becomes for the first time inevitable. But in any event, the Indiana Supreme Court,
after Shideler, has definitely rejected an accural date for tort actions which would
begin only when the plaintiff's condition became apparent to him. See also, Pitts v.
Unarco Indus., 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983). In this recent asbestos product liability
suit decided under Indiana law the court stated: "Passive silence, however, is insuffi-
cient to trigger the fraudulent concealment doctrine." Id. at 278.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 3
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of limitations. With accrual of his action commencing at the onset
of his exposure to asbestos, or at the beginning of his undiscovered
disease, the statute would presumably have run out before he
discovered his developing illness. He might, however, have alleged
that the dangers of asbestos had been fraudulently concealed from him
by his employer, and therefore the statute of limitations should have
been tolled until he discovered the fraud, i.e., learned of his illness.3
6
It is unlikely, however, that the employer's concealment of asbestos
dangers would have been enough for his claim to survive the 1963
amendment. Even the California Supreme Court has ruled that con-
cealment of the dangers of asbestos would be insufficient to overcome
the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy under a rubric
of intentional tortious conduct by an employer.3 7 It is necessary, the
California court held, to allege and prove that the employer knew
and concealed from the employee that the employee had actually con-
tracted asbestosis in order for an action at common law to lie. 8
The tort system, then could provide no relief for Bunker, or for
workers similarly situated, without the existence of a culpable non-
employer, third party. This result is consistent with the objective of
workers' compensation, which is to provide certain, albeit partial, no-
fault relief for those injured out of and in the course of their employ-
ment, as a substitute for common law tort actions against employers. 9
Bunker's experience, however, suggests that workers' compensation
is not all that certain.
35. IND. CODE 34-1-2-2 (1982).
36. See French v. Hickman Moving & Storage, 400 N.E.2d 1384, 1398 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980) (alleged fraudulent concealment of conversion); Cordial v. Grimm, 169
Ind. App. 58, 68, 346 N.E.2d 266, 272 (1976) (alleged legal malpractice).
37. See Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Rudkin, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 474-75, 612 P.2d
948, 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 864 (1980).
38. Id. at 477, 712 P.2d at 955-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
In a recent diversity case decided under Indiana law, Braswell v. Flinkote Mines,
Ltd., 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1983) the Shideler doctrine was held aplicable to determin-
ing the accrual date of an asbestos-related product liability claim. Id. at 531-33. The
court held that the existence of undiscovered personal injury was sufficient in Indiana
to complete the accrual of a tort claim, but it noted that "Indiana courts have not
explicitly held that the 'wrongful act' or 'impact' rule of accrual applies specifically
in product liability actions against asbestos manufacturers." Id. at 532. The court noted
that in Shideler the New York cases were cited with approval, but it was not per-
fectly clear whether the citation of authority was to adopt the New York "impact"
rule or merely to reject the "susceptible of ascertainment" rule which a line of In-
diana cases prior to Shideler had supported. See Leibman, Worker's Compensation, 1981
Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 15 Ind. L. Rev. 453, 467-68 n.116 (1983).
The court concluded, despite a strong dissent by Judge Swygert, that, when Indiana
plaintiffs do contract an occupational disease, their cause of action accrues no later
than their last exposure to the disease causing agent. Id. at 533.
39. See F. MARSHALL, A. KING & V. BRIGGS. LABOR ECONOMICS 467 (4th ed. 1980).
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IV. BUNKER'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM
Following exploratory surgery in 1976, in which Bunker's
asbestosis was first diagnosed, Bunker filed for compensation under
Indiana's Occupational Diseases Act.4" Prior to this operation, Bunker
was employed by the Grain Processing Corporation in Iowa, and he
returned to that job shortly thereafter. He is still employed by that
company.41 He claims that he was disabled for a brief period in 1976
because of asbestosis caused by his early Indiana employment and
is therefore eligible for compensation under the Indiana Occupational
Diseases Act.42
Bunker's claim was denied by the Indiana Industrial Board on
the theory that it was not timely filed.43 The Act provides that "no
compensation shall be payable . . . in cases of occupational diseases
caused by the inhalation of silica dust, coal dust, or asbestos dust
• . . (3) years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards
of such disease."" The Act also provides,
[tlhat in all cases of occupational disease caused by the
exposure to radiation, no compensation shall be payable
unless disablement, as herein defined, occurs within two (2)
years from the date on which the employee had knowledge
of the nature of his occupational disease or .... should have
known of the existence of such disease and its causal rela-
tionship to his employment. 5
The Board ruled that Bunker's "last exposure to the hazards of"
asbestos dust was in 1950, and the Act's statute of limitations had
run against him.4" Bunker mounted three arguments in opposition to
the Board's ruling. They can be described as his continuing exposure
argument,47 his equal protection argument,4" and his due process
argument.49
40. Bunker, 441 N.E.2d 8, 9-10 (Ind. 1982).
41. Id. at 16 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
42. IND. CODE SS 22-3-7-1 through 22-3-7-38 (1982).
43. Bunker, 441 N.E.2d 8.
44. IND. CODE S 22-3-7-9(f) (1982).
45. Id.
46. Bunker, 426 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
47. See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 67a-84 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
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A. Continuing Exposure
Bunker submitted medical evidence to the Industrial Board main-
taining that once a person inhales asbestos dust his exposure to asbestos
continues indefinitely.' The asbestos fibers remain in the blood stream
providing continuous irritation to the lung tissue which ultimately
results in the scarring effect known as asbestosis, a disease which
seriously impairs respiratory function. 1 The interaction of asbestos
particles with the victim's lungs and gastrointestinal system can also
lead to a form of cancer known as mesothelioma.52 But, to date, Bunker
claims only to be a victim of asbestosis.'
Significantly, the Industrial Board did not reject the validity of
Bunker's medical evidence. It conceded that "Plaintiffs exposure may
be a continuing one,"' but even if that were true, the Board's find-
ings stated, "the legislature cannot be said to have intended the term
'last exposure' to mean other than 'last expousre' during and 'in the
course of employment.' ",55 Bunker's last exposure during and in the
course of employment was in 1950.
Indiana courts do not recognize official legislative history.
Minutes of committee hearings and records of legislative debates on
the floor of the General Assembly are inadmissible for the purpose
of interpreting enacted Indiana law.' It is nevertheless unlikely that
individual legislators in 1937,5 while considering the original asbestos
dust limitation bill before them, 58 were contemplating the possibility
of a continuing exposure to an irritant taking place within a victim's
body. However, it is appropriate to presume that the legislators at
that time were contemplating the enactment of a limitation provision
which would be consistent with the objectives of the underlying
50. See Brief for Appellant at 7, Bunker v. National Gypsum Co., 426 N.E.2d
422 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief].
51. Bunker 426 N.E.2d at 424 (discussing the medical studies of Dr. Irving
Sellikoff and others).
52. Id. at 424 n.4.
53. Id. at 422.
54. Appelant's Court of Appeals Brief, supra note 50, at 3 (quoting Award
from Industrial Board of Indiana, Dec. 26, 1979).
55. Id.
56. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19, 20 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
57. "[Tlhe legislature imposed the three-years-from-exposure limitation in 1937
.... Bunker, 426 N.E.2d at 425.
58. "[Tlhe initial version of the Indiana act expressly recognized asbestosis
and imposed the three-year-from-exposure limitation ..." Id. at 424.
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legislative scheme of workers' compensation. 9 The basic idea which
drives the workers' compensation system is that of providing a no-
fault insurance mechanism which will cushion the employee from the
health and safety risks of the workplace, risks which he is unable
to bear himself." When an employee is injured or suffers health im-
pairment which definitely arises out of and in the course of his or
her employment and is unable to recover from the compensation
system, the system clearly suffers a failure. When Bunker argued that
with respect to the statutory phrase "last exposure" the Board "should
have applied a literal reading . . .consistent with . . liberal con-
struction to effectuate the purpose [of the legislative scheme],""1 he
was invoking a well established guideline which courts have general-
ly followed in applying workers' compensation law.
Yet if Bunker's interpretation of the phrase "last exposure" is
correct, so as to encompass coverage of continuing exposures, the
result would be a compensation system with no practical time limita-
tion for a large number of cases. Many toxic materials gain their tox-
icity by their resistance to the body's efforts to excrete them.
Although Bunker is correct that the purpose of workers' compensa-
tion "is the humane one of compensation," 2 it is also clear that the
Indiana General Assembly intended that effectuating this purpose
should be subject to some reasonable set of time limitations. His con-
stitutional arguments, in which he claims that the limitation provi-
sions actually chosen by the Indiana legislature have, over time, pro-
ven to be unreasonable, advance his thesis with more force than his
continuing exposure argument.
B. Equal Protection
Bunker argued that the statute of limitation provision of the In-
diana Occupational Diseases Act denied him equal protection of the
laws as guaranteed him under the United States 3 and Indiana
Constitutions64 because the Act creates one invidious class distinction
59. "The objective of these statutes was to assure benefits to workers and
their families in the event of work-related injuries or death while, at the same time,
limiting the actual liability of employers to the size of the worker compensation pay-
ment." MARSHALL. KING & BRIGGS, supra note 39, at 467.
60. See CHAMBERLAIN & CULLEN, supra note 1, at 498-99.
61. Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief, supra note 50, at 8.
62. Id.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states in pertinent part: "nor shall any State
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
64. IND. CONST. art. I, § 23 states: "The General Asembly shall not grant to any
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on its face and another in its operation, neither of which is justified
on any rational basis.
6 5
As noted, the Act provides that radiation victims are permitted
to bring claims within two years from the time they discover their
illness,66 while asbestos victims have three years from the date of their
last exposure to the hazard,67 without regard to whether or not il-
lness is discovered, or is even discoverable. The other class distinc-
tion identified by the claimant is that between victims continuously
exposed to a workplace environment containing asbestos fibers, and
those who employment exposure to asbestos was cut off by some later
circumstance, but was sufficient for the disease to have taken root
and manifested itself many years later. The former group of victims
would presumably show symptoms of disease while still within the
limitation period, but the latter group, in most cases, would not.
National Gypsum's reply to both class distinctions was that
Bunker had failed to prove that the classifications were irrational. 8
Thus, to have prevailed in the first case, the plaintiff would have had
to show that radiation and asbestos victims were similarly situated
and that one class had been granted a privilege denied the other."
Specifically, the plaintiff had to show that both types of disease have
a latency period following exposure, and that the latency periods for
both hazards are the same in order to claim that the limitation periods
should be made the same. 0 That the General Assembly had ample
opportunity over the years to align the two classes, and had opted
not to do so, was presented by the defendant as evidence that the
resulting classification had a rational basis.7
The failure of a legislature to act affirmatively to align classes
which it has created, perhaps inadvertently in response to the political
pressures of particular times, is, of course, scant evidence that such
class distinctions are reasonable ones. While an affirmative act of a
legislature must be given a strong presumption of constitutionality,
the failure of it to act should not be accorded the same weight. The
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall
not equally belong to all citizens."
65. Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief, supra note 50, at 21-22.
66. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
68. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Bunker v. Nat'l. Gypsum Co., 426 N.E.2d
422 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), at 29-30 [hereinafter cited as Appellee's Court of Appeals Brief].
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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enactment in 1937 of the three year limitation period for exposure
to silica dust and asbestos"2 was undoubtedly a humane response to
the prevailing medical knowledge of the time and a political response
to the labor agitation of the 1930's. The amendment providng for a
discovery rule in the case of radiation exposure, which was enacted
in 1961, was a humane response to newly recognized medical infor-
mation about the nature of radiation sickness.73 That the legislature
did not, and has not yet, adopted a discovery rule for asbestos, or
has not yet seen fit to increase the three year limitation period runn-
ing from date of exposure to asbestos, does not indicate an essential
dissimilarity between the delayed manifestation characteristics of
asbestos expsoure and radiation exposure.
The response to National Gypsum's assertion that the claimant
has failed to prove that asbestos victims and radiation victims are
similarly situated and so cannot demand that the classes should be
treated identically, was that the defendant had refuted more than was
claimed. Bunker argued that asbestos exposure, like radiation
exposure, often lejds to a latent period before the symptoms of disease
are discoverable. 4 He did not claim that the latent periods for the
two hazards are always, or ever, the same-only that they are both
frequently of many years' duration. The general time limitation scheme
that is appropriate to one type of exposure is probably appropriate
to the other, but there is no insistence here on identical treatment-
only that the underlying characteristic of delayed manifestation should
be treated with equal fairness in both cases.
The defendant asserted that Bunker's second alleged class
distinction- that between victims with continuous exposure during
employment, and those with early but discontinued exposure-has not
led to dissimilar treatment because both classes are subject to the
same three year limitation period running from date of last exposure. 5
Bunker argued, however, that it is not the last exposure which pro-
duces the disease, but rather there is a threshold exposure which
varies with individuals, beyond which the ultimate development of
disease becomes likely even without continued exposure. Thus, conti-
nuing exposure to asbestos fibers in the work environment beyond
the threshold exposure has for many victims only one primary effect,
72. Coal dust exposure was added to the three year limitation period class in
1974. Bunker, 441 N.E.2d at 14.
73. Id.
74. Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief, supra note 50, at 22.
75. Appellee's Court of Appeals Brief, supra note 68, at 31.
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a legal one: it creates eligibility for recovery under the Act which
is denied those who are cut off from exposure during the disease's
gestation period. 6 This period is likely to run more than three years
before the onset of symptoms," and is even more likely to run three
years before the worker is in fact disabled, disablement being the
trigger point for recovery under the Act."
In response, the defendant asserted that longer exposure in-
creases the likelihood that disease will in fact be contracted, and
therefore a limitation scheme which reflects these probabilities is an
equitable one and is consistent with the principles of equal protection.79
Ultimately the reviewing courts had to address the question whether
the Act's limitation period was so short as to deny Bunker the pro-
tections it was designed and enacted to provide" regardless of the
level of protection the Act affords to other classes of victims-a due
process review as opposed to an equal protection analysis.
C. Due Process
On appeal from the Industrial Board, the Indiana Court of
Appeals, in a 2-1 decision,81 ignored Bunker's continuing exposure argu-
ment and that part of his equal protection argument dealing with
radiation victims. In a footnote, however, the court agreed with Bunker
that there was no rational basis for dividing "exposed workers for
76. Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief, supra note 50, at 25. Bunker failed
in his brief to develop fully this argument, a lack which apparently caused the Indiana
Court of Appeals to investigate medical sources outside the record. See Bunker, 426
N.E.2d at 424-25.
77. See Id. at 425 n.6 and accompanying text. The medical evidence reviewed
by the court demonstrated that initial exposure to asbestos does not produce even
abnormal x-rays, let along symptoms, in the vast majority of cases of ultimate disease
victims until many years after their exposure.
78. IND.CODE S 22-3-7-9 (f) provides that "no compensation shall be payable unless
disablement ...occurs ...within three [3] years after the last day of the last ex-
posure to the hazards of such disease [exposure to asbestos dust]." Sub-section (e) (new)
states that "[t]he term 'disablement' means the event of becoming disabled from earn-
ing full wages at the work in which the employee was engaged when last exposed
to the hazards of the occupational disease .. " Clearly, an employee can become aware
of incipient disease, yet not be disabled as defined under the Act. As the Indiana
Court of Appeals pointed out, such an employee who also was no longer being exposed
to the asbestos dust hazard would see his workers' compensation claim evaporate while
he was still earning full wage but knowing he ultimately would become disabled. Bunker,
426 N.E.2d at 424.
79. Appellee's Court of Appeals Brief, supra note 68, at 31.
80. See infra note 81-95 and accompanying text (Due Process).
81. Bunker, 426 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (Hoffman, J. dissenting).
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purposes of coverage into those continually exposed for the necessary
20 to 30 year gestation period and those not."' But the court, in rever-
sing the dismissal of Bunker's claim by the Industrial Board, based
its decision primarily on the ground that he had been denied due pro-
cess of law.83
In substance, the court was persuaded by medical evidence
published by Dr. Irving Sellikoff and others during the 1960's and
1970's which demonstrated conclusively the delayed manifestation
characteristics of asbestosis and mesothelioma 4 The court noted that,
even if exposed parties were looking for evidence of the disease before
the onset of its symptoms, they would probably be unsuccessful,
because a study of "asbestos insulation workers revealed chest x-ray
abnormality in only 10% of those whose exposure began less than
ten (10) years before the study. . . ."' Thus, there could be no way
that the majority of parties such as Bunker, parties whose exposure
to asbestos was not continuous, could ever recover compensation under
the limitation provision of the Indiana statute." That the provision
was enacted in 1937 before these medical facts were widely known,
accepted, and digested by the public was reason to believe the three
year ban was not recognized by the legislature as being unusually
short. But now, the court held, "it appears to us that the statute can
no longer stand. To impose its ban is to violate the classic constitu-
tional mandate, because to do so amounts to a practical denial of the
very right to recovery that the statute was intended to provide. 18 7
In dissent, Judge Hoffman, pointed out that while three years
might be less than generous, permitting Bunker to recover would be
tantamount to ratifying a twenty-eight year limitation period, clearly
82. Id. at 425 n.7.
83. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1 states in pertinent part: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Bunker
had argued that IND.CODE S 22-3-7-9 (e) (now f) not only abrogated his fourteenth amend-
ment due process rights, but also violated IND.CONST. art. I. S 12 which states: "All
courts shall be open; and every man, for injury done to him in his person, property,
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." See Appellant's Court of Ap-
peals Brief, supra note 50, at 16. The state and federal provisions are not entirely
congruent, yet neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court made clear which
constitutional provision they were addressing. It seems reasonsable, however, to con-
clude that in a statute of limitations context the excessive shortening of a limitation
period can be thought of as both a denial of remedy and a denial of legal process.
Thus both the state and federal protections would be at issue.
84. Bunker, 426 N.E.2d at 424-25.
85. Id. at 424.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 425.
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a much longer period than-would be necessary to pass constitutional
muster."s The legislature must be permitted to draw the line at some
point which would protect the defendant's right to be confronted with
fresh evidence. On balance, Judge Hoffman found that the provision
as enacted "clearly states the wishes of the Legislature. It is neither
unreasonable nor unconstitutional." 89
On transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court," the court focused
on the presumption of constitutionality that muA be afforded acts
of the legisature. In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court
emphasized that plaintiffs challenging statutes of limitation have a
heavy burden, and that the statutes would be upheld "unless the time
allowed is so short that the statute amounts to a practical denial of
the right itself and becomes a denial of justice."91 That result is what
the majority of the court of appeals determined had occurred in
Bunker.
The supreme court ruled that a practical denial of Bunker's rights
had not occurred because there was evidence that the three years
from date of last exposure limitation period was reasonable when
enacted, and might very well be reasonable today.92 The court held
that the legislature could have found that relatively short periods of
exposure to asbestos were unlikely to develop into asbestosis; and
therefore, in balancing the repose interests of employers against the
interests of the few claimants like Bunker who actually developed the
disease after less than two years exposure, the repose interest should,
in justice, be permitted to prevail. 3
The court's reasoning probably focuses too narrowly on the
specific Bunker facts. If Bunker had been exposed for a ten year period
and then had left National Gypsum, or had been transferred within
the company to a job where he was not exposed to asbestos, he would
still probably have been denied compensation. That such a result is
likely is borne out by the same medical study relied on by the court
of appeals. 4 Only 44 percent of the asbestos victims whose exposure
began 10 to 19 years before being x-rayed showed any abnormalities,
and those abnormalities were minimal. 5
88. Id. at 425-26 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Bunker, 441 N.E.2d 9 (Ind. 1982).
91. Id. at 12-13 (quoting Wright-Backman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 307, 133
N.E.2d 713 (1965)).
92. Id. at 14.
93. Id.
94. Bunker, 426 N.E.2d at 424-25.
95. Id. at 425.
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Clearly, Bunker belongs to a substantial class of asbestos vic-
tims, a class which could not have been envisioned by a legislature
which acted before the long latency period of asbestos related diseases
became fully understood as a result of Dr. Sellikoff's studies completed
in the past two decades. If in fact there is now compelling evidence
that this forty-five year old statute of limitations is cutting off a far
greater portion of potential workers' claims than was originally in-
tended by the legislature, we must then inquire whether the courts
have a constitutional duty to act.
V. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
The Indiana Supreme Court has repeatedly deferred to the In-
diana General Assembly on statute of limitation questions.' It upheld
the special time limitation of the Indiana Malpractice Act which
shortened the general limitation period. 7 It also upheld the ten year
repose provision of the Indiana Product Liability Act of 1978,"s and
in 1958, in the context of a silica dust case, it upheld the same statute
of limitations that was before it in Bunker.9 In each of these cases
the court emphasized the repose interests of statutes of limitation,
rather than the other basic purpose of these statutes, which is to
motivate parties to exercise their known rights promptly on pain of
losing them. But, if the Indiana General Assembly were to begin
tomorrow to enact generous limitation periods with statutory discovery
provisions, it is likely that the supreme court would uphold their con-
stitutionality because Indiana's high court has traditionally disapproved
of judicial activism once the Indiana General Assembly has spoken.00
It should be noted that in Bunker the Indiana Court of Appeals
did not hold that the legislature had acted improperly or unconstitu-
tionally when it originally enacted the three year limitation period
for asbestos exposure-only that increasing medical knowledge now
required the updating of the statute of limitations if the statute is
to retain its original constitutionality. The supreme court position,
however, clearly places responsibility for such updating with the
legislature. And, until the legislature acts, the 1937 limitation statute
is to retain the force of law. The high court has consistently granted
96. Bunker, 441 N.E.2d at 11.
97. Id. at 13 (discussing Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d
585, 603, which upheld IND. CODE SS 16-9.5-1-1 through 16-9.5-10-5 (Burns Supp. 1982)).
98. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981).
99. Bunker, 441 N.E.2d at 13 (discussing Woldridge v. Ball Brothers Co., Inc.,
129 Ind. App. 420, 150 N.E.2d 911 (1958), trans. denied).
100. See discussion and authorities cited, Bunker, 441 N.E.2d at 11-13.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/3
BUNKER v. NATIONAL GYPSUM
the acts of the Indiana General Assembly a very strong presumption
of constitutionality.' °
In the hope of finding a more activist sentiment on the United
States Supreme Court, Bunker filed an appeal 102 under 28 U.S.C., Sec-
tion § 1257(2) which gives a losing party who has challenged the con-
stitutionality of a state statute a right of direct appeal when the
highest court of the state rules against him by holding that a state
statute is consistent with the United States Constitution. 3 In Bunker,
however, the Indiana Supreme Court added an additional state ground
for its decision which may have played some part in its ultimate
disposition. The court ruled that the court of appeals below "had erred
by its use of (medical) evidence" which was found outside the record.'04
The court of appeals' reversal of the Industrial Board had relied heavi-
ly on that court's own independent review of medical research which
led it to conclude that the legislature had acted as it did in 1937
because adequate medical knowledge of the risks of asbestos exposure
did not yet exist or was inconclusive.'9
Bunker's direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court was
dismissed for want of a "substantial federal question."'' 6 And although
the Supreme Court has consistently declined to decide state statute
of limitations or repose statute cases on federal constitutional
grounds, 7 the procedural issue, that of the Indiana Court of Appeals
going beyond the record for evidence, may have reinforced its deci-
sion to dismiss.
101. Id.
102. Bunker v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 441 N.E.2d 8 (Ind. 1982), appeal docketed,
51 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1983) (No. 82-1243).
103. 28 U.S.C. S 1257 (1976) states in pertinent part:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
as follows:
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute
of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its
validity.
104. Bunker, 441 N.E.2d at 11.
105. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
106. 43 S.Ct. Bull. (CCH) B 1801 (Apr. 18, 1983).
107. See e.g., Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), ap-
peal dismissed (for want of a substantial question), 401 U.S. 901 (1971); Howell v. Burk,
90 N.M. 688, 568 P2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977); Anderson
v. Wagner, 79 Ill.2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979), appeal dismissed sub nom Woodward
v. Burnham City Hosp., 449 U.S. 807 (1980).
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In any event the United States Supreme Court's dismissal ended
the dispute in Bunker with the Indiana Supreme Court's reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment and equivalent state constitutional pro-
visions regarding equal protection and due process quickly becoming
firm precedent in Indiana. In Woodworth v. Lilly Industrial Coatings,
Inc.,"8 the claimant argued that the general occupational disease two
year "last exposure rule""1 9 (rather than the three year rule govern-
ing dust diseases),1 was an unconstitutional denial to him of due pro-
cess because it unreasonably barred his claim for leukemia allegedly
contracted after he was exposed to various carcinogens in his employ-
ment. Relying on Bunker, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of the claim." '
In Braswell v. Flinkote Mines, Ltd.,112 the plaintiffs attacked the
repose provision found in the Indiana Product Liability Act 1 ' which
bars claims against a product seller ten years after the product has
been delivered to an initial user or consumer.1 The plaintiff asbestos
workers argued that a statute which could run against them before
they could possibly know that they were injured was a denial to them
of due process of law. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals pointed
out that it was the Indiana general personal injury tort statute of
limitations, 5 which runs two years from the time the cause of action
accrues,"' that was at issue and not the ten year outer cutoff of the
Product Liability Act. The problem for the plaintiffs was the same,
however, because Indiana has rejected a discovery rule for its general
tort limitation statute.' This interpretation, in the context of an
occupational disease tort claim, means that the cause of action accrues
no later than the plaintiffs most recent exposure to the disease-causing
substance, even though the plaintiff may be unaware of incipient
108. 446 N.E.2d 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
109. IND. CODE S 22-3-7-9 (f) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "No compensation
shall be payable for or on account of any occupational diseases unless ... disablement
occurs within two (2) years after the last exposure to the hazards of the disease .. "
110. See IND. CODE S 22-3-7-9 (f) (1982) quoted in text accompanying n. 44.
111. Woodworth, 446 N.E.2d at 648.
112. 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1983).
113. Id. at 529, discussing IND. CODE SS 33-1-1.5-1 to -8 (1981).
114. IND. CODE S 33-1-1.5-5 (1981).
115. Braswell, 723 F.2d at 529 (referring to IND. CODE S 34-1-2-2 (1976)).
116. IND. CODE S 34-1-2-2 (1976) provides: "The following actions shall be
commenced within the periods herein prescribed after the cause of action has accrued
.(1) For injuries to person ...within (2) years."
117. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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disease development at the time."1 8 The federal court noted that "[tihe
reasonableness of [such] statutes of limitation was recognized by the
Supreme Court of Indiana in Bunker v. National Gypsum Co."..9
In Pitts v. Unarco Industries,2 a diversity case decided prior
to Braswell, the plaintiff had also argued that the repose provision
of the Indiana Product Liability Act, which barred her wrongful death
claim, was a denial to her of due process. Her theory was that her
spouse, an asbestos insulation mechanic, was exposed to asbestos dust
before enactment of the statute of repose, and that implementing the
act's provisions would now deprive her of the property right which
resided in her wrongful death cause of action. The court ruled that,
as to her, the wrongful death claim had not yet accrued, and there
was no property right in an unaccrued claim.'21
Under the rule reiterated in Braswell, it should be noted that
the mechanic himself would have had an accrued claim for personal
injury at some point in time after his first exposure to the asbestos
dust which ultimately caused his occupational disease.'22 Presumably,
each additional exposure could produce a new claim,12 but after his
final exposure to the deleterious dust the two year personal injury
statute of limitations ran against him even though he had not yet
discovered, nor could have discovered, the asbestos-related disease
developing in his body. The ten year outer cutoff of the Product
Liability Act would not have affected this personal injury claim
because that statute applies only to causes of action accruing after
June 1, 1978.124 Nevertheless, failure to discover his illness within two
years of his last exposure would have been sufficient to bar him under
the general tort limitation statute.
With respect to the widow's wrongful death claim, the court
stated further that even if she did have a property right in the cause
of action, the Product Liability Act section which barred it was not
118. 723 F.2d at 529, 531-33.
119. Id. at 531.
120. 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983).
121. Id. at 279.
122. See supra note 38 (discussion of application of the Shideler doctrine to
Braswell).
123. The "impact" or "wrongful act" rule would find every exposure to asbestos
dust on actionable event. Also, under the view that there must first be some harm
to the claimant each additional exposure to asbestos following the beginning of the
latent disease would presumabley constitute an actionable aggravation.
124. IND. CODE S 33-1-1.5-8 (1982).
1984]
Liebman and Dworkin: A Failure of Both Workers' Compensation and Tort: Bunker v. Natio
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
a denial of due process.2" The court cited Bunker for the proposition
that the constitutionailty of repose provisions should be upheld as en-
couraging the prompt presentation of claims. 126
Mrs. Pitts also raised a Fourteenth Amendment, equal protec-
tion argument, based on the allegedly irrational distinction between
users of old and new products.2 7 Bunker was again cited as authority
for upholding the federal equal protection constitutionality of the
statute.'28 Finally, the Bunker case was cited as authority to reject
Pitt's argument that the Indiana Constitution's "privileges and im-
munities" clause had been violated, "even though Justice Hunter
thought application [of the occupational disease statute of limitations]
would 'defy .. . the privileges . ..and immunities guaranteed our
citizens.' "29
Justice Hunter, in his dissent in Bunker," was particularly con-
cerned about the court's deciding an important constitutional issue
without adequate development of the facts. He noted that the con-
stitutional question had only been raised after an administrative hear-
ing in which Bunker had presented only his continuing exposure argu-
ment. Thus, only a meager record reached the high court. Hunter
argued that either Bunker should be granted a trial de novo on the
constitutional issues,: or the case should be decided for National Gyp-
sum on a finding that Bunker was never disabled according to the
meaning of the Act. With that finding, the constitutioinal questions
could be deferred to another day, when presumably, action by the
Indiana General Assembly or the United States Congress would make
the issue moot. However, Bunker's temporary but total disablement
in 1976 was pressed by the claimant, and was recognized by the In-
dustrial Board, the court of appeals, and a majority of the supreme
court. Therefore, the fate of a substantial number of asbestos victims
will rest on a constitutional decision derived from an administrative
record not adequately developed."'
VI. CONCLUSION
It is apocryphal that hard cases make bad law. Richard Bunker
experienced a relatively short exposure to asbestos over thirty years
125. Pitts, 712 F.2d at 279.
126. Id. at 279-80.
127. Id. at 280.
128. Id..
129. Id. at 280, quoting Bunker, 441 N.E.2d at 18 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (refer-
ring to IND. CONST. art. I, S 23).
130. Bunker, 441 N.E.2d 8, 14 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 17.
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ago. There is no question but that he has contracted asbestosis, yet
he remains gainfully employed, and neither he nor his family are cur-
rently destitute. There was no doubt a natural reluctance to put the
workers' compensation system or the tort system at his disposal.
Nevertheless, medical evidence suggests that Bunker is likely
to become permanently disabled and impaired earlier than he might
have been but for his exposure to asbestos in 1949-50. Other victims
simiarly exposed are likely to fare much worse. The impairments these
people will suffer clearly arises, at least in part, from an agent en-
countered out of and in the course of their employment. The workers'
compensation system was enacted to provide relief in such cases, and
the tort litigation system exists to provide relief in those instances
where a third party defendant has either caused injury by negligent
conduct, or by permitting a defective injury-causing workplace pro-
duct to enter the stream of commerce. When neither system is able
to provide assistance to the impaired worker, a system failure must
be recognized.
Bunker had no third party claim, nor was he permitted to main-
tain a direct action for negligence against his former employer. If a
worker must be subject to the exclusivity principle of the workers'
compensation system, that system should remain highly responsive
to his legitimate claims. A workers' compensation statute of limita-
tions which cuts off a substantial number of meritorious claims through
no fault of the claimants must be branded as a failed provision.
The remaining question is whether the courts should take respon-
sibility for remedying such defects. The answer should come from the
judicial traditions of the jursidiction. In Indiana, responsibility for
repairing legislative errors is usually left with the legislature. 3 '
Although a good deal of suffering may take place before the legislature
acts, a tradition of judicial restraint in judicial review cases is a policy
meriting respect, if it is not carried too far.
Before deciding whether a judicial remedy was appropriate in
the Bunker case, we should perhaps recognize that the public policy
issues raised in the case are part of a larger problem. Nationally, our
health and accident compensation systems are badly in need of direc-
tion and coordination. The mission of each such system should be
directed at two goals: the first is the providing of basic compensation
from the many who benefit from the enterprise to the relatively few
victims of its activities-an insurance concept; the second is the crea-
tion of incentives, to all parties who can, to find ways to reduce the
132. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
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aggregate costs of accidents and health impairments, costs which in-
clude the expense of administration and dispute settling.
13
These latter cost components have been outrageously exacerbated
by the lack of coordination among tort, workers' compensation and
welfare systems. At this point in the development of American health
and accident compensation systems there seems little reason for
Richard Bunker to have been shunted from one system to another,
eventually winding up empty handed, while he diligently pursued a
claim for injury sustained out of and in the course of his employment.
But the task of rebuilding and recoordinating our network of health
and accident systems to provide the desired efficiencies and incen-
tives is clearly a legislative task. Whether judicial intervention will
advance or retard the process is not all clear.
133. See generally, G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
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